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1 Introduction
After the publication of two influential articles by Shimer (2004, 2005) - in which he shows
that the standard Mortensen-Diamond-Pissarides (MDP) model is unable to replicate observed
fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in response to productivity shocks of plausible
magnitude - the empirical appraisal of the cyclical behaviour of equilibrium unemployment and
vacancies has regained a lot of interest in the macroeconomic debate (e.g. Cardullo 2010 and
Guerrazzi 2011).
Retrieving US quarterly data over a fifty-year time horizon, Shimer (2004, 2005) measures,
inter-alia, the autocorrelation and the volatility of unemployment, vacancies and labour pro-
ductivity. One of the most striking finding of his empirical explorations is that the standard
deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio, i.e., the labour market tightness indicator, is
almost twenty times as large as the standard deviation of labour productivity over the period
under examination. The so-called ‘Shimer puzzle’ (or ‘unemployment volatility puzzle’) comes
from the fact that the MDP model predicts that those two variables should have nearly the
same volatility.1
A number of contributors tried to address this theoretical inconsistency within the US econ-
omy. For instance, Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005a,b) rely on real wage stickiness questioning
the Nash bargaining hypothesis. Furthermore, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) show that cal-
ibrating the value of non-market activities close to labour productivity amplifies the volatility
of labour market tightness. Moreover, Pissarides (2009) suggests that taking into account that
mainly the wages of newly hired workers respond to productivity shocks brings the model close
to available evidence. In addition, Silva and Toledo (2009) and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer
(2013) argue, respectively, that labour turnover costs and financial frictions may generate the
required amplification mechanism.
Spurred on by such a stream of theoretical efforts aimed at reconciling Shimer’s (2004, 2005)
empirical findings with the well-established theory of equilibrium unemployment, a number of
scholars become active in testing the soundness of the unemployment volatility puzzle even
outside the US economy. First, Zhang (2008) explores the cyclical behaviour of unemployment
and vacancies in Canada. Moreover, Miyamoto (2011) replicates the experiment with Japan
data. Furthermore, Gartner et al. (2012) do the same in Germany. Even if they provides
different theoretical rationales for observed paths, all those authors find that in all the countries
taken into consideration the volatility of labour market tightness is much higher than the one
1The intuition for those results is that wages bargained according to the Nash rule should absorb a great
deal of productivity shocks. Therefore, vacancies and unemployment should be only partially affected by erratic
disturbances affecting the value of output.
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attached to productivity.2
More recently, Justiniano and Michelacci (2011) as well as Amaral and Tasci (2012) test
Shimer’s (2004, 2005) empirical results over a set of OECD countries in which a number of EU
members is included. However, until now, nothing has been said about the cyclical behaviour
of unemployment and vacancies in the Italian context. As a consequence, in this paper, we aim
at filling this gap by addressing the macroeconomic fluctuations of unemployment, vacancies,
tightness and productivity in the Italian labour market over the last twenty years.
All over this period, the Italian labour force survey together with official national accounts
are able to provide homogeneous quarterly figures for both unemployment and labour produc-
tivity measured, respectively, as the fraction of the labour force actively searching for work
and added value per worker. Unfortunately, the same does not hold for job vacancies and
the corresponding vacancy rate. As a consequence, according to data availability on unfilled
job openings, our empirical analysis is split in two sub-periods. Specifically, the former (1993-
2003) is covered by the help-wanted time series (HWTS) provided by the Italian Institute for
the Development of Vocational Training (ISFOL), while the latter (2004-2012) is analyzed by
means of the harmonized, or official, vacancy rate worked out by the Italian National Institute
of Statistics (ISTAT).3 Retrieving data from both series, we explore the macroeconomic fluctu-
ations of the Italian labour market by following the estimative approach adopted throughout
the literature mentioned above.
The main results achieved in this paper are the following. On the empirical ground, con-
firming previous findings on the unemployment volatility puzzle, we find that, in both periods,
despite some heterogeneities in the correlation matrix of the involved series, the labour market
tightness indicator is much more volatile than labour productivity. Specifically, in the time-
span covered by the ISFOL HWTS (ISTAT harmonized vacancy rate) the ratio between the
volatility of labour market tightness and the corresponding index for productivity is around
five (thirty-three).
In addition, from a theoretical point of view, we show that a matching model with segmented
labour markets with on-the-job search build along the lines of Krause and Lubik (2006) has
the potential to provide the required amplification mechanism outperfoming the baseline MDP
model. In details, we show that search effort spent by workers employed in bad jobs to look for
better positions can magnify the effects of productivity shocks on labour market tightness.
2Specifically, the reported ratio between those indexes is about eighteen for Canada, thirteen in Japan and
fifty in Germany.
3In the Italian context a measure of labour scarcity has sometimes been used as a proxy of the vacancy
rate (e.g. Sestito 1991, Padoa-Schippa 1991 and Destefanis and Fonseca 2007). The behaviour of this index is
explored in Appendix 1.
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The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 analyses the patterns of unemployment, va-
cancies, tightness and productivity in the Italian labour market over the last twenty years
by exploiting available unfilled job opening series. Section 3 develops a matching model with
segmented labour markets and on-the-job search by exploring its amplification mechanism.
Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Italian labour market facts
In this section we provide an empirical analysis of the Italian labour market dynamics over
the period 1993-2012. However, as we stated above, this time-horizon is not covered by a
unique series for unfilled job openings. To the best of our knowledge, the longest and more
reliable Italian vacancy series available the period under examination are essentially two, i.e.,
the ISFOL HWTS that covers about the first decade and the harmonized ISTAT vacancy rate
that holds all over the second one.
As a consequence, in what follows, we provide distinct empirical analyses for the two relevant
sub-periods.4 Specifically, for each selected time-span, we take into consideration the level and
trend paths of unemployment, vacancies, labour market tightness and productivity. In addition,
a special attention is paid to the Beveridge curve, i.e., the well-known relationship between
unemployment and vacancies by testing different specifications. Moreover, for each series, we
report detailed statistics on volatility, persistence and correlation.
2.1 The period covered by the ISFOL HWTS (1993.1-2003.4)
The ISFOL HWTS is grounded on help-wanted job advertisements collected by the Centre for
Business Statistics (Centro di Statistica Aziendale) headquartered in Florence. Data collection
started about thirty years ago. However, essentially for reasons of attrition, homogeneous figures
are available only for the period 1993-2003 (e.g. Mandrone 2012). All over this time-horizon,
the ISFOL HWTS retrieves information about job advertisements on the main thirty-two Italian
newspapers.
The basic unit of survey of the ISFOL HWTS are job advertisements. However, the in-
formation collected in each newspaper is processed in order to derive an estimation for the
corresponding number of job vacancies posted by firms on a quarterly basis. Thereafter, fol-
lowing the official definition also implemented by ISTAT, the corresponding vacancy rate is
4The two series for unfilled job openings do not overlap and this does not allow to implement consistent
merging procedures. Moreover, as suggested by Valletta (2005), the use of an HWTS to retrieve vacancies
beyond the 90s will be rather misleading for the growing reliance of alternative sources such as internet posting.
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obtained by dividing the total number of available jobs, i.e., vacancies plus the number of
employed people, by total employment.
The level and trend paths of unemployment (u), vacancies (v), labour market tightness
(v/u) and labour productivity (a) all over the time-span taken into consideration by the ISFOL
HWTS are illustrated in the four panels of figure 1 (all the series are seasonally adjusted; HP
trends obtained by setting the smoothing parameter at 1, 600).
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Figure 1: Italian labour market facts (1993.1-2003.4)
The four diagrams show that the period covered by the ISFOL HWTS is characterized by a
recover of labour market tightness as well as a mildly upward trend in labour productivity. It
is quite likely that those encouraging patterns are the joint outcome of labour market reforms
aimed at increasing employment flexibility (cfr. Treu Act) and the end of austerity policies
carried out after the European monetary crisis bursted at the beginning of the 90s.5
5An empirical assessment of the Treu Act grounded on an efficient matching frontier approach is provided
by Destefanis and Fonseca (2007).
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The level and trend log-deviation relationships between unemployment and vacancies are
illustrated in the two panels of figure 2 (both diagrams include the results of a linear OLS
regression among the involved variables).
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Figure 2: Unemployment versus vacancies (1993.1-2003.4)
The two diagrams reveals that the series of vacancies retrieved from the ISFOL HWTS is
consistent with textbook negative shape of the Beveridge curve only when trend log-deviations
are concerned. By contrast, the level relationship between unemployment appears definitely
upward-sloped with a strong degree of statistical significance.6
A set of summary statistics concerning the trend log-deviation dynamics of the series de-
picted in figure 1 can be found in table 1.
ln (u) ln (v) ln (v/u) ln (a)
Standard deviation 0.013 0.089 0.011 0.002
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.706 0.665 0.665 0.646
ln (u) 1 −0.710 0.987 −0.124
Correlation matrix ln (v) − 1 −0.599 0.550
ln (v/u) − − 1 −0.038
ln (a) − − − 1
Table 1: Summary statistics, quarterly Italian data (1993.1-2003.4)
The figures in table 1 suggest some interesting but rather preliminary conclusions. First,
as we already said in commenting figure 2, there is a negative relationship between the trend
6Using the same data source, similar results were derived by Sestito (1988) and Bragato (1990).
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log-deviations of unemployment and vacancies confirming the conventional wisdom about the
shape the Beveridge curve. However, data also reveal an unconventional counter-cyclicality
of the labour market tightness indicator. Second, the implied series of vacancy rates is more
volatile than unemployment and productivity corroborating the results obtained over the other
OECD countries (e.g. Amaral and Tasci 2012), Moreover, somehow in line with Shimer’s
(2004-2005) findings, the volatility of labour productivity is far below the volatility of labour
tightness; indeed, the ratio between the latter and the former is around five, a value higher
than the one predicted by the conventional theory of equilibrium unemployment but rather far
below the ones found in other countries.
Despite the short length of the time-horizon, the latter result is a first signal that even in
Italy a standard MDP model might not good enough to replicate observed data. Obviously, all
the issues related to the derivation of a vacancy index from newspaper advertisements without
any reference to shared official criteria call for an additional examination.7
2.2 The period covered by the ISTAT vacancy rate (2004.1-2012.4)
In the third quarter of 2003, ISTAT started a new survey on job vacancies and worked hours. In
compliance with the official Eurostat guidelines on job vacancy reporting, this survey aims at
measuring vacancies, job flows and worked hours in firms that employ more than ten employees.8
As a consequence, this survey provides a harmonized vacancy rate that directly measures the
extent of search externalities experienced by Italian firms in their recruiting processes.
Up to present, ISTAT discloses the Italian official vacancy rate without any adjustment.
Therefore, in order to remove seasonal patterns that may artificially affect the volatility of
data, we filtered the series by averaging, on a quarterly basis, deviations from a linear decreasing
trend.9 After the ISFOL HWTS analyzed above, this series is intended to become the longest
data source on Italian unfilled job openings.
The paths of unemployment, vacancies, labour market tightness and labour productivity all
over the period covered by the ISTAT vacancy rate are illustrated in the four panels of figure 3
7For instance, Abrahm (1987) argue that occupation composition of employment, equal employment op-
portunity pressures as well as consolidation in newspaper markets may lead to substantial distortions in the
estimation of vacancies from job advertisements. Furthermore, in the Italian labour market additional in-
consistencies may derive from the fact that usually recruitments occur through informal links (e.g. Pistaferri
1999).
8The sample size is about 15, 000 firms selected by drawing on the National Statistical Register of Active
Firms (ASIA).
9In this way, the adjusted series results quite smoother than the original one. More technical details on
seasonal adjustments are given by Go´mez and Maraval (1996).
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(all the series are seasonally adjusted; HP trends obtained by setting the smoothing parameter
at 1, 600).
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Figure 3: Italian labour market facts (2004.1-2012.4)
The time horizon described by the ISTAT vacancy rate is quite different from the one
illustrated in figure 1. As shown in the four panels of figure 3, this period is characterized
by quite adverse labour market conditions; indeed, after the satisfying performance of the
beginning, unemployment begun to grow at increasing rates while labour market tightness
displays a quite clean decreasing trend. In addition, the path of labour productivity appears
seriously hit by the strong recession of 2008-2009.
The level and trend log-deviation relationships between unemployment and vacancies are
illustrated in the two panels of figure 4 (both diagrams include the results of a linear OLS
regression among the involved variables).
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Figure 4: Unemployment versus vacancies (2004.1-2012.4)
Even the picture of the relationships between unemployment and vacancies obtained by
means of the ISTAT harmonized vacancy rate are completely at odds with the ones retrieved
in figure 3; indeed, the textbook negative shape of the Beveridge curve is obtained only by
considering the levels of the involved variables but it fails as far as trend log-deviations are
concerned.10 However, the fit of the upward-sloped regression line appears quite low.
A set of summary statistics concerning the trend log-deviation dynamics of the series de-
picted in figure 3 can be found in table 2.
ln (u) ln (v) ln (v/u) ln (a)
Standard deviation 0.033 1.079 0.112 0.003
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.884 0.567 0.782 0.753
ln (u) 1 0.575 0.787 0.575
Correlation matrix ln (v) − 1 0.894 0.556
ln (v/u) − − 1 0.769
ln (a) − − − 1
Table 2: Summary statistics, quarterly Italian data (2004.1-2012.4)
From the point of view of co-movements, the figures in table 2 are somehow more uncon-
ventional than the ones in table 1; indeed, all over the concerned period, vacancies, tightness
and productivity are all counter-cyclical. In addition to measurement issues due to the not too
large number of observations, this pattern suggests that supply shocks may be not the unique
10This result was already stressed by Baldi and Sorrentino (2009) on a pioneering study on the properties of
the harmonized Italian vacancy rate series.
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driver of business cycles (e.g. Justiniano and Michelacci 2011).11 However, in line with previ-
ous findings on the unemployment volatility puzzle reviewed in the introduction, the figures in
table 2 strengthen some results shown in table 1 by conveying that the volatility of the official
labour market tightness indicator exceeds the one on productivity by an order of magnitude;
indeed, the ratio between the latter and the former is about thirty-three, a figure that seems to
approach the biggest value of about fifty obtained by Gartner et al. (2012) with German data
covering the period 1980-2004.12
3 Towards a theoretical explanation of observed volatil-
ity
Data analyzed in section 2 do not provide robust cyclical regularities, especially in terms of co-
movements among the involved series. The only established finding is that even in the Italian
context the volatility of the labour market tightness indicator is much higher than the volatility
of productivity no matter the data under scrutiny.13 As a consequence, in order to explain this
dynamic pattern, we develop a theoretical framework able to generate a suitable amplification
mechanism. In this regard, we present an equilibrium version of the matching framework
put forward by Krause and Lubik (2006) and we show that labour market segmentation and
the possibility of on-the-job search has the potential to magnify vacancy and unemployment
fluctuations in response to productivity shocks.
3.1 Labour market segmentation and on-the-job search
Krause and Lubik (2006) develop a matching model in which consumption goods are produced
in two intermediate sectors which are assumed to differ in terms of vacancy posting costs.
Specifically, one of the two intermediate sectors is assumed to be characterized by higher costs
of vacancy posting with respect to the other. Therefore, as far as labour market conditions
are concerned, the former will be less tight than the latter. Moreover, for a decreasing return
argument, the former will be characterized by higher productivity and wages with respect to
the latter mirroring traditional segmentation processes undergoing in actual labour markets
11Among OECD countries, Amaral and Tasci (2012) find that labour productivity is counter-cyclical in
Australia, Poland and Spain.
12Focusing on a longer time-horizon, Amaral and Tasci (2012) report a figure of thirty-three for Germany
and Spain.
13As we show in Appendix 1, this stylized fact also appears even when the vacancy rate is proxied by an
indicator of labour scarcity.
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usually labeled with the distinction among primary and secondary sector of the economy.14 In
turn, this segmentation of labour market conditions will lead workers employed in the low-wage,
high-tightness sector to make some efforts to find a job in the high-wage, low-tightness sector.
Calibrating and simulating the model, Krause and Lubik (2006) show that their framework is
able to fairly reproduce the observed path of US vacancy and unemployment fluctuations in
response to productivity shocks of plausible magnitude.
In this paper we follow a different approach. Specifically, we analytically solve a steady-state
version of Krause and Lubik (2006) model and then we assess the elasticities of labour market
tightness with respect to productivity under different scenarios. As shown by Shimer (2005),
such elasticities are useful approximations to the volatilities of the corresponding variables in the
dynamic stochastic set-up.15 Furthermore, we formally and numerically show that search effort
can increase the response of the labour market tightness indicator to productivity disturbances.
3.2 The model
We assume that the economy is populated by a measure one of risk-neutral workers. Time is
continuous and the discount rate is denoted by r. There are two intermediate good sectors
in the economy, dubbed as g (good) and b (bad). The two intermediate goods are combined
together via a CES aggregator to produce the unique final consumption good. Therefore,
Y = a
(
q
ρ−1
ρ
g + q
ρ−1
ρ
b
) ρ
ρ−1
ρ > 1 (1)
where Y is the consumption good, a is a measure of aggregate productivity, qi is output in
sector i, with i = {g, b}, and ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate
goods.
Product markets are perfectly competitive. As a consequence, taking the consumption good
as numeraire, cost minimization leads to the following inverse demand functions:
pi(qi) = a
( qi
Y
)
−
1
ρ
i = {g, b} (2)
In each intermediate sector, each firm can hire one worker at most, that in turn produces
one unit of the intermediate good. Therefore, if ei is the level of employment in sector i, then
ei = qi, with i = { g, b }.
14Evidence of labour market segmentation in the Italian context is given by Cipollone (2001) and, more
recently, by Battisti (2013).
15Indeed, Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) show that the two outcomes coincide in the limit when the arrival
rate of shocks is close to zero or changes in productivity are small.
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The only difference between the two sectors is in the flow cost paid to keep a vacancy open,
namely, we assume that cg > cb. As it will be clear later on, the sector with higher vacancy
costs will exhibit lower employment and, for decreasing returns in the production function of
consumption goods, higher productivity and wages. So, employed workers in sector b exert
some effort in searching for a job in sector g.
On the one hand, the flow of new matches in sector b is denoted by m(vb, ub) = µv
1−η
b u
η
b ,
with µ > 0 and 0 < η < 1. Denoting θb ≡ vb/ub, the job finding rate is given by f(θb) ≡
m(vb, ub)/ub and the rate at which vacancies are filled is q(θb) ≡ m(vb, ub)/vb, which is positive,
decreasing and a convex function of θb. It is worth noting that η is the elasticity of the expected
duration of filling a vacancy q(θ)−1 with respect to tightness.
On the other hand, in sector g, the matching function is m(vg, ug+seb) = µv
1−η
g (ug+seb)
η,
in which s is the amount of search effort spent by the eb workers employed in sector b to look
for a better-paid position in the other sector. If we define θg ≡ vg/(ug + sb), then we can
again convey the job finding rate and the job filling rate as functions of tightness only, i.e.,
f(θg) ≡ m(vg, ug+seb)/(ug+seb) and q(θg) ≡ m(vg, ug+seb)/vg. Furthermore, in both sectors,
at an exogenous rate δ, a firm-worker pair is destroyed.
Denoting by φ the share of employees in sector g, the prices of the intermediate goods can
be written as:
pg = a
(
1 +
(
1− φ
φ
) ρ−1
ρ
)
1
ρ−1 (3)
pb = a
(
1 +
(
φ
1− φ
) ρ−1
ρ
)
1
ρ−1 (4)
In steady-state, the flows in and out of employment status must be equal. Therefore,
δφe = sf(θg)(1− φ)e + f(θg)ug (5)
δ(1− φ)e = f(θb)ub − sf(θg)(1− φ)e (6)
where e ≡ eb + eg is total employment.
The on-the-job mechanism implies there is a share of workers sf(θg)(1−φ)e that quit their
job in sector b to become employed in sector g. The discounted present value of employment
in sector g, i.e., Veg, verifies the following Bellman equation:
rVeg = wg + δ (Vug − Veg) (7)
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where wg is the real wage in intermediate sector g and Vug represents the discounted expected
lifetime income of an unemployed worker in the same sector.
Similarly, the discounted present value in employment in sector b, i.e., Veb, is assumed to
verify
rVeb = max
s
wb − k(s) + δ (Vug − Veb ) + sf(θg) (Veg − Veb ) (8)
Workers employed in sector b may exert some effort in searching for a job in sector g. The
disutility of on-the-job search is captured by a convex function k(·) = κsσ, with σ > 1. The
first-order condition (FOC) for the problem in (8) is given by
k′(s) = f(θg) (Veg − Veb ) (9)
Denoting the value for leisure by z, VUi verifies the following Bellman equation:
rVui = z + f(θi) (Vei − Vei) i = {g, b} (10)
Unemployed workers are free to direct their search towards either sector. However, a non-
arbitrage condition ensures that the value of being unemployed must be equal across sectors.
Hence,
rVug = rVub = rVu (11)
On the firms’ side, the expected discounted profits of a vacancy takes the following form:
rJvi = −ci + q(θi) ( Jei − Jvi ) i = {g, b} (12)
Moreover, the expected utilities of a filled vacancy in the two sectors are equal to
Jeg = pg − wg + δ ( Jvg − Jeg ) (13)
Jeb = pb − wb + δ ( Jvb − Jeb ) + sf(θg) ( Jeb − Jeb ) (14)
A firm-worker pair in sector b breaks down not only at the exogenous destruction rate δ
but also whenever the employee finds a job in sector g. In each sector, firms post vacancies as
long as the discounted expected profits are nonnegative, so that Jvi = 0, for i = {g, b}. Using
(12), (13), and (14) we derive
pb − wb
r + δ + sf(θg)
=
cb
q(θb)
(15)
13
pg − wg
r + δ
=
cg
q(θg)
(16)
The free-entry zero profit condition in sector g, i.e., eq. (16), is qualitatively identical to
the one retrieved in the standard MDP model and it equates the expected cost of filling a
vacancy (the RHS) with the expected revenues (the LHS). By contrast, in sector b, expected
revenues are discounted by a further term, i.e., sf(θg), that takes into account the probability
that workers may leave their job in order to switch in the other sector.
When a worker and an employer form a match, the surplus Vei − Vu + Jei with i = {g, b},
is shared through Nash bargaining. If β denotes the bargaining power of the workers, then the
surplus sharing condition can be written as
(1− β) (Vei − Vu ) = βJei i = {g, b} , 0 < β < 1 (17)
Consistently with Krause and Lubik (2006), we do not consider the option of recall. As
a consequence, this means that wages in previous jobs are not part of the outside options of
workers.16
Using eq.s (10)− (12) and (17) it is possible to derive that
θb cb = θg cg (18)
Since cg > cb, then θg < θb. Because of the higher vacancy costs, less firms enter sector
g leading to a lower tightness, lower employment and a higher sector productivity implied by
the decreasing marginal returns characterizing the production function of final goods.
Exploiting eq.s (10), (12), and (17), the FOC for the search effort in eq. (9) can be written
as
s =
(
cb θbβ
κσ (1− β)
(
1 −
(
cb
cg
)1−η)) 1σ−1
(19)
Furthermore, using the eq.s (7), (8), (10), (13), and (14), the Nash bargaining solution in
eq. (17) allows to write the wage equation in both sectors. Specifically,
wg = β ( pg + cgθg ) + (1− β)z (20)
wb = β (pb + (1− s)cbθb ) + (1− β) ( z + k(s)) (21)
16Krause and Lubik (2006) extensively discuss the consequences of imposing a recall in the Nash bargaining
game.
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It is worth noting that eq. (19) implies that dwb/d s = (1 − β)k
′(s) − βcbθb < 0. This
inequality follows because the stronger the effort devoted to search for a job in sector g, the
lower the expected surplus of a match in sector b, as it breaks up more easily. Therefore, this
translates into a lower wage wb.
Definition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is defined by a vector (θi, wi, pi (qi)), with i = {g, b},
a value of search effort s, a share of employment in the g sector φ, and a value of consumption
output Y satisfying:
• The wage equations (20) and (21);
• The non-arbitrage condition in eq. (18);
• The FOC for the optimal search effort in eq. (19);
• The zero-profit conditions in eq.s (15) and (16);
• The FOCs in the final good sector in eq. (2) and eq. (1) for Y .
To find the steady-state equilibrium, we insert the expressions for the real wages in eq.s (20)
and (21) in the zero-profit conditions conveyed by eq.s (15) and (16) and then we substitute θg
for θb via the non-arbitrage condition in eq. (18). In this way, we derive
(1− β) (pb − z)− βcbθb −
cb (r + δ)
q(θb)
− (1− β)κsσ + cbθbs
(
β −
(
cb
cg
)1−η)
= 0 (22)
(1− β) ( pg − z )− βcbθb −
cg (r + δ)
q(θb)
(
cb
cg
)η
= 0 (23)
Eq. (19) recalls that search effort s is a monotonically increasing function of θb. As a
consequence, the system in eq.s (22) and (23) is composed by two equations in two unknowns,
i.e., θb and φ.
17 If a (unique) solution of the system exists, then all the other remaining
variables of the model can be easily obtained by using the eq.s cited in definition 1. The
following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 1 If z < 1, then there is a unique solution for the system in eq.s (22) and (23).
Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium of the model exists and it is unique.
17Recall that, according to eq.s (3) and (4), pg and pb depend on φ only.
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The intuition for the statement in proposition 1 can be given as follows. For the Inada
conditions in the matching function and in the CES aggregator and the decreasing marginal
productivity in the latter, it is easy to show that eq. (22) is an increasing function in (φ, θb)
space, that intersects the horizontal axis in a point greater than zero, and that goes to +∞ as
φ = 1. Moreover, eq. (23) is a decreasing function in (φ, θb) space, that intersects the vertical
axis in a point between zero and one, and that goes to +∞ as φ = 0. As a consequence, a
solution for system in eq.s (22) and (23) exists and it is unique. Technical details are given in
Appendix 2.
3.3 Amplification of productivity shocks
We now compute the elasticity of tightness with respect to the productivity parameter a. Taking
into account the non-arbitrage condition in eq. (18), the elasticity of tightness in sector g has
the same magnitude of the one in sector b. In other words,
dθb
da
a
θb
=
dθg
da
a
θg
≡ ǫa (24)
Totally differentiating the system in eq.s (22) and (23), allows to derive the following ex-
pression:
ǫa =
pb
Φ0 +
cb(η(r+δ)+βf(θb)+Φ1)
(1−β)q(θb)
(25)
where
Φ0 ≡ −
∂ pb
∂ φ
∂ φ
∂ θb
θb =
φcb
(
βf(θb) + η(r + δ)
(
cb
cg
)η−1)
(1− φ) (1− β)q(θb)
(26)
Φ1 ≡ sf(θb)
((
cb
cg
)1−η (
1 +
1− β
σ − 1
)
− β
)
(27)
Two terms distinguish ǫa from the corresponding expression of the elasticity in a standard
MDP model. The first term is the derivative in eq. (26), i.e., the term stemming from the
assumption that there is a decreasing demand for the intermediate goods produced by firms.
In the textbook MDP model, it is implicitly assumed that firms face an infinitely elastic demand
so that output price does not change. In addition, the second term is given by the expression
in eq. (27), i.e., the term that conveys the presence of on-the-job search in sector b.
The amplification potential of eq. (25) is conveyed by the following proposition:
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Proposition 2 If
(
cb
cg
)1−η
< β(σ−1)
σ−β
, then ǫa is increasing in s.
The proof comes directly from the inspection of eq. (25). If (cb/cg)
1−η < β (σ − 1) / (σ − β) ,
then Φ1 < 0 and search effort has a positive impact on ǫa. In other words, proposition 2 claims
that the introduction of on-the-job search increases the elasticity of tightness in response to an
increase in productivity. Under plausible assumptions about the arrival rate of shocks in a and
the magnitude of its change, this implies that the introduction of on-the-job search amplifies
the volatility of tightness in response to shocks on productivity.
A rationale for this result goes as follows. When a positive productivity shock hits inter-
mediate sectors of the economy, firms post more vacancies both in the high-paid and in the
low-paid sector. Higher values of vg raises search effort s.
18 Thereafter, more job-seekers in
sector g imply a lower expected duration of vacancies q(θg)
−1, so even more vacancies are posted
in sector g. Vacancy creation and employees’ search effort are strategic complements, in other
words, an increase in vg triggers search effort that, in turn, raises vg even more. The process
ends because of the convexity assumption about the search cost in eq. (8). The final result is a
larger amplification in vacancy posting in response to a productivity shock. A complementarity
between sectors also arises. If search effort of low-paid employees goes up, then congestion effect
in the matching technology will make more difficult for unemployed workers to find a high-paid
job. As a consequence, they will direct their search toward the low-paid sector. This in turn
will boost vacancy creation in that sector.
3.4 A calibration experiment
The model developed above is quite non-linear. Therefore, in order to provide a quantitative
assessment of the theoretical results underlying proposition 2, we rely on a computational
experiment. Specifically, we calibrate the model and we evaluate how ǫa react to search effort
spent by workers employed in sector b.19 Moreover, for reasons of comparability, we take as
reference period of calibration the last decade only, i.e., the period covered by the ISTAT
harmonized vacancy rate.
The model is calibrated as follows. First, consistently with Shimer (2005), the parameters
of the matching function and the job destruction rate, respectively, µ, η and δ, are retrieved
18Totally differentiating eqs. (18) and (19) leads to ds/dθg > 0.
19MATLABTM codes are available from the authors.
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by computing job finding and separation rates exploiting OECD data on long-term unemploy-
ment.20 Moreover, in order to consider efficient fluctuations, we set β = η (e.g. Hosios 1990).
The value for productivity, i.e., a, is derived by averaging data in the forth panel of figure 3.
Similarly, the value of leisure, i.e., z, is obtained by averaging labour productivity all over the
period and taking into account OECD labour shares and replacement rates (e.g. Martin 1996).
The figure of the interest rate is consistent with an annual real interest rate slightly above 4%.
The remaining model parameters are calibrated following the contribution by Krause and
Lubik (2006). Specifically, bad and good job creation costs, namely, cb and cg, are set in order
to mimic a 1 to 4 ratio while the cost function parameter, i.e., κ, is fixed at 4%. Furthermore,
consistently with the evidence provided by Falzoni et al. (2007), the value of the elasticity
of substitution among the two intermediate goods, i.e., ρ, is chosen in order to replicate an
equilibrium share of good jobs, i.e., φ, around 30%. Thereafter, the model is simulated for
different values of the search elasticity parameter, i.e., σ, in order to solicit different search
effort levels, i.e., different values of s.21
The whole set of parameter values is collected in table 3 while simulation results are illus-
trated in figure 5.
Parameter Description Value
µ Scale parameter of the matching function 1.548
η Elasticity of the matching function 0.519
δ Job separation rate 0.090
β Workers’ bargaining power 0.519
a Average productivity 0.014
z Value of leisure 0.005
r Interest rate 0.012
cb Bad job creation cost 0.200
cg Good job creation cost 0.800
κ Search cost function parameter 0.040
ρ Elasticity of substitution 2.450
Table 3: Calibration
20Identification issues are addressed by instrumenting with trend values of the involved variables.
21Given the values of η, β, cb and cg, σ is allowed to vary between 55 and 1, 000 in order to meet the
requirements of proposition 2.
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Figure 5: Simulation results
The diagram in figure 5 clearly corroborates the theoretical results of proposition 2; indeed,
there is a clear positive relation between search effort and the elasticity of the labour market
tightness indicator with respect to productivity shocks.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we explore the macroeconomic fluctuations of unemployment, vacancies, tightness
and productivity in the Italian labour market over the last twenty years. Since the selected
time-horizon is not covered by a unique time series for unfilled job openings, our empirical
analysis is divided in two parts. The former (1993-2003) is covered by the ISFOL HWTS, while
the latter (2004-2012) is analyzed by means of the harmonized ISTAT vacancy rate.
The main results achieved in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, on the empirical
ground, we find that in two periods under examination, despite some significant differences in
the co-movements of involved series, the volatility of the labour market tightness indicator is
much higher than the volatility of labour productivity. This finding appears quite robust and
extends to Italy previous results on the unemployment volatility puzzle derived in other OECD
countries (e.g. Zhang 2008, Miyamoto 2012 and Gertner et al. 2012).
Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, we show that a matching model with segmented
labour markets and on-the-job search build along the lines of Krause and Lubik (2006) has the
potential to provide the required amplification mechanism. Specifically, we show that search
19
effort spent by workers employed in the secondary sector of the economy to look for jobs in
the primary sector can exacerbate the impact of productivity disturbances on labour market
tightness.
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Appendix 1: The ISAE indicator of labour scarcity (1994.4-
2005.2)
As we stated in the introduction, In Italy, before 2004, there was no official data on vacancies
and the only survey aimed at catching the unmatched recruiting efforts of firms was the one
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grounded on help-wanted job advertisements carried out by ISFOL.
However, at the beginning of the 90s, a number of scholars (e.g. Sestito 1991 and Padoa-
Schioppa 1991) retrieved estimations of the Beveridge curve by relying on a quarterly survey
carried out on Italian manufacturing firms by the Institute for Economic Studies and Analyses
(ISAE). This survey, among the other things, asked firms about their production restrictions
due to recruiting difficulties. Drawing on this information, Sestito (1991) builds an indicator
of labour scarcity that proxies the level of vacancies.22 Aggregating regional figures, the ISAE
survey allows to retrieve this additional measure of unfilled job openings over the period 1994.4-
2005.2.23
The level and trend paths of vacancies and labour market tightness implied by the ISAE
indicator of labour scarcity developed by Sestito (1991) are illustrated in figure A1 (all the series
are seasonally adjusted; HP trends obtained by setting the smooting parameter at 1, 600).
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Figure A1: Vacancies and tightness implied by the ISAE indicator (1994.4-2005.2)
The LHS panel of figure A1 shows that the path level of vacancies implied by the ISAE
indicator of labour scarcity is completely at odds with respect to the one tracked by the ISFOL
HWTS. However, the path of labour market tightness on the RHS confirms the beneficial effects
on employment prospects carried out by the Treu act after 1997 already stressed in section 2.
A set of summary statistics concerning the trend log-deviation dynamics of unemployment,
vacancies, labour market tightness and productivity all over the period covered by the ISAE
indicatior of labour scarcity can be found in table A1.
22Specifically, this indicator is a non-linear monotonic transformation of the percentage of firms constrained
by the scarcity of labour. Additional details can be found in Sestito (1991) and, more recently, in Destefanis
and Fonseca (2007).
23The overall national reference is retrieved by weighing the regional figures with the corresponding employ-
ment level.
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ln (u) ln (v) ln (v/u) ln (a)
Standard deviation 0.014 0.062 0.027 0.002
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.747 0.516 0.508 0.822
ln (u) 1 0.268 0.510 −0.068
Correlation matrix ln (v) − 1 −0.681 0.595
ln (v/u) − − 1 −0.579
ln (a) − − − 1
Table A1: Summary statistics, vacancies measured with the ISAE indicator (1994.4-2005.2)
Despite the mild procyclicality of labour productivity, the figures in table A1 show the same
unconventional counter-cyclical behaviour of vacancies and tightness displayed by the official
data provided by ISTAT collected in table 2. However, in terms of standard errors, those
figures corroborates to some extent the empirical findings presented in section 2; indeed, even
when the ISAE indicator of labour scarcity is taken as a proxy of vacancies, the volatility of
the labour market tightness ratio is much higher (about fiveteen times) than the volatility of
labour productivity.
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 1
Since for eq. (19) search effort s is a function of θb, eq.s (22) and (23) can be considered
as implicit functions of only two endogenous variables, i.e., φ and θb. We denote the former
ZPb(φ, θb) = 0 and the latter ZPg(φ, θb) = 0.
Consider first ZPg(φ, θb) = 0. It is easy to see that, as θb → 0, then pg → z and, for
eq. (3), this implies that φ tends to be a number strictly greater than zero. For the same
eq. (3), if θb → +∞, then φ → 0. Totally differentiating ZPg(φ, θb) = 0 and applying the
implicit function theorem, we also get d φ/d θb < 0. As a consequence, this expression describes
a decreasing relationship in the (φ, θb) space.
As far as ZPb(φ, θb) = 0 is concerned, if φ → 0, then for eq. (4), we have pb → 1. Under
the assumption of z < 1, this implies that θb must be a number strictly greater than zero.
Conversely, if φ → 1, then we have pb → +∞ and θb → +∞. Moreover, from eq. (19) we
derive
ds
dθb
=
s
θb (σ − 1)
(B1)
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The result in eq. (B1) leads to
dZPb
d θb
= −
ηcb (r + δ)
f (θb)
− βcb (1− s) −
scb (σ − β)
σ − 1
(
cb
cg
)1−η
< 0 (B2)
Using the implicit function theorem for ZPb(φ, θb) = 0, we have d φ/d θb > 0. This means
that this expression describes an increasing relationship in the (φ, θb) space. As figure B1 makes
clear, a unique equilibrium exists in φ and θb. In turn, the other endogenous components of
the model can be easily determined. Specifically, from eqs. (18)− (21) one respectively obtain
the equilibrium values of θg, s, wg and wb. Finally, the steady-state eq.s in (5) and (6) allow to
derive the levels of employment and unemployment in each sector.
Figure B1: Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
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